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Notes and Comments
A Balanced Approach to Employer-Employee Trade
Secrets Disputes in California
By Diane Louise Wear*
The concept of a trade secret is an elusive one at best.' Because of
the ever-expanding variety of business transactions, the types of mfor-
mation, methods, processes, and designs that conceivably could be
trade secrets are virtually limitless. For this reason, an exact defimtion
of a trade secret has been declared by the Restatement of Torts to be
"not possible."'2 Nevertheless, as the Restatement illustrates, the out-
lines of subject matter protectible as trade secrets are perceivable. The
Restatement extends trade secret protection to "any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it.' ' 3 Accordingly, any subject matter
* A.B., 1977, University of California at Berkeley. Member, Third Year Class.
1. The difficulty of ascertaining the exact nature of a trade secret is illustrated by the
debate over whether a trade secret is "property." Milgrim considers trade secrets to be prop-
erty and cites several California cases supporting this view. 12 BusiNESS ORGANIZATIONS,
R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS §§ 1.0[1l]-.01[2] (1978) [hereinafter cited as MILGRIM].
Whether or not trade secrets are property in the ordinary sense is not so vital a question m
the employer-employee relationship, with which this Note is concerned. As was said by
Justice Holmes m his oft-quoted opinion m E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Mas-
land, 244 U.S. 100 (1917): "The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is
an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valu-
able secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confi-
dence that he accepted. The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be." Id. at
102.
2. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 6 (1939). California has adopted
the Restatement definition of trade secrets. Cal Francisco Inv. Corp. v. Vrionis, 14 Cal.
App. 3d 318, 322, 92 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1971); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d
244,251, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 23 (1968); Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279,
288-89, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 211 (1962); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal.
App. 2d 398, 403, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds in
Nicholas v. Hast, 62 Cal. 2d 598, 601, 400 P.2d 763, 765, 43 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1965).
3. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 5 (1939). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 499c(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979) (defining trade secrets for purposes of imposing criminal
penalties for nmsappropnation).
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that is used continuously in one's business, 4 is relatively secret,- and is
sufficiently novel6 to give its possessor a competitive advantage in busi-
ness, may be considered a trade secret.
Any employer who possesses trade secrets may find it necessary or
desirable during the course of business operations to disclose those
4. The Restatement makes it clear that information not continuously used in one's
business cannot be a trade secret, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939), al-
though it may constitute "confidential information" which may be protectible. Compare
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939).
5. Although arguably only information that is absolutely secret should be protectible
as a trade secret, the view adopted by the Restatement is that only a "substantial element of
secrecy must exist." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Information that is
generally known in the trade or easily discoverable does not meet even this relative stan-
dard. Id See also 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES § 52.1 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN]; 12 MILGRIM, supra
note 1, § 2.07[1]. It is interesting to compare the standard of the Restatement with the de-
gree of secrecy required by California Penal Code § 499c (theft of trade secrets), which pro-
vides that "a trade secret shall be presumed to be secret when the owner thereof takes
measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the
owner to have access thereto for limited purposes." CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1979). This presumption has withstood constitutional attack. People v. Serrata, 62
Cal. App. 3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
6. The Restatement definition, which California has adopted, see note 2 supra, does
not require that a trade secret be comprised of patentable subject matter. RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). See also 2 CALLMANN, supra note 5, § 52.1; 12 MILGRIM,
supra note 1, § 2.08. In Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.
Cal. 1958), aj'dper curiam, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), the court, applying California law,
required proof that the claimed trade secret was not obvious to one "skilled in the art,"
which is the patentability standard. Id. at 258. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). Sarkes has been
criticized for imposing this standard in trade secrets cases, see 12 MILGRIM, supra note 1,
§ 2.08[3] n. 18, and has not been followed in California. For a comparison of the protections
afforded by patents and trade secrets see 12A MILGRIM, supra note 1, § 8.02[8]; Mahon,
Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 536 (1968).
Although the patentability standard should not apply in trade secrets cases, patents and
trade secrets are somewhat related. The Supreme Court decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), reaffirmed the protectibility of trade secrets despite the
existence of the patent laws. Such a reaffirmation was necessary in view of language in
earlier Supreme Court cases, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964), which cast doubt on the validity of state trade secrets laws. Since Kewanee
the validity of such laws protecting matter which is in fact a trade secret has not been ques-
tioned. California addressed this issue shortly after the Kewanee case in Sinclair v. Aquari-
us Elec., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974) (relying on Kewanee to hold
state trade secrets law not preempted by federal patent law). For background on the pre-
emption problem and the Kewanee case see Stem, A Reexamination ofPreemption ofState
Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927 (1974); Wydick, Trade
Secrets Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and Kewanee (Part I), 55 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 736 (1973), and Wydick, Trade Secrets. Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and
Kewanee (Part lI-Conclusion), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 4 (1974) (written after the appellate
court decision in Kewanee). See also 12A MILGRIM, supra note 1, § 7.08[2][c]-.08[2][f] &
app. J.
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secrets to an employee. The employer who does so has a significant
interest in maintaining the competitive advantage which the trade
secrets afford and for this reason will seek to insure that the employee
neither uses the secrets for his or her own benefit nor discloses them to
others. Many employers seek such insurance through contractual ar-
rangements in which the employee agrees not to use or disclose the
employer's trade secrets.7 Such agreements have been enforced, pro-
vided the information is found to be in fact a trade secret.8 Even absent
an express contract, however, an employer who has disclosed trade
secrets to an employee is not entirely without protection should that
employee later seek to use those secrets; the tort theory of breach of
confidential relationship long has been applied to allow recovery
against the employee. 9
The employee to whom trade secrets have been disclosed also has
an interest to protect. An employee who leaves his or her employer's
business and subsequently competes with that former employer, either
as an independent business or as an employee of an established firm,
has a great interest in being able to market the skills and knowledge
acquired during previous employment. So long as such skills and
knowledge are general, the virtually uniform rule is that the former
employee is entitled to use them in competition. 10 When the former
employee's knowledge includes information that is a trade secret, how-
ever, the former employee's interest in employment mobility and the
former employer's interest in protection of the trade secret conflict
sharply. I I
The California courts frequently have been asked to determine the
rights of former employers and employees to information, claimed to
be a trade secret, which has been disclosed to the former employee. If
the claims are litigated on the basis of an express contract not to use
trade secrets, the court must determine whether that contract validly
restrains the employee from using the information in question.' 2 If the
7. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 5, § 51.2(c); 12 MILGRIM, supra note I, §§ 3.01-.05[5]. See
also Hays, Unfair Compeition-4nother Decade, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 69-73, 77-78 (1963).
8. See note 74 infra.
9. See notes 25-41, 103-06 & accompanying text infra.
10. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 5, § 54.2(a).
11. See, e.g., 2 CALLMANN, supra note 5, § 54.2.
12. Employment contracts often are subject to attack under § 16600 of the California
Business and Professions Code, which provides that, absent statutory exception, "every con-
tract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business
of any kind is to that extent void." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964). See, e.g.,
Fortna v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634,323 P.2d 146 (1958); Morris v. Harris, 127 Cal. App.
2d 476, 274 P.2d 22 (1954). However, the California courts have not considered contracts
restraining use of trade secrets to be within this prohibition and generally have upheld such
contracts, as in Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 321 P.2d 456 (1958); Golden State Linen
Serv., Inc. v. Vidalin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1977); State Farm Mut. Auto.
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claims litigated are not based on contract, the court's task becomes
more difficult. The court then must formulate and apply a standard for
determining liability under the tort theory of breach of confidential re-
lationship.' 3 Ideally, such a standard should set forth explicitly what
the former employer must prove to recover for use of secret informa-
tion.
In seeking to define such a tort standard, the California courts
often implicitly distinguish the "customer list" trade secret, where the
claimed trade secret is a list of customers' 4 or information pertaining to
them, 15 from all other types of trade secrets.' 6 This distinction arose
out of the 1952 California Supreme Court decision in Aetna Building
Maintenance Co. v. West.' 7 In Aetna the court enumerated five ele-
ments establishing liability in employer-employee customer list cases
not governed by express contractual provisions.' 8 Aetna is the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's latest word on customer lists, and the majority of
appellate court decisions since that case have interpreted Aetna as re-
quiring proof of all five elements before recovery is allowed in a list
trade secrets case. In non-list trade secrets cases, however, appellate
courts largely have ignored Aetna and have applied less stringent stan-
dards. 19
Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App. 2d 418, 344 P.2d 821 (1959); Gordon v. Wasserman, 153
Cal. App. 2d 328, 314 P.2d 759 (1957).
13. Commentators have suggested that liability also may be based on an implied con-
tract not to use trade secrets. See, e.g., 2 CALLMANN, Supra note 5, § 54.1; 12 MILGRIM,
supra note 1, § 4.02.
14. Some courts have held that the identities of customers are not trade secrets if they
are generally known or easily ascertained. This is often the situation in cases involving lists
naming wholesale customers. See, e.g., Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal.
2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944); Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal. App. 627, 10 P.2d 485 (1932).
Consequently, the term "customer list" as used in this Note refers to retail customer lists or
cases in which retail list principles have been held applicable.
For a general background on the situations where the identity of customers are too well
known to constitute trade secrets see 2 CALLMANN, supra note 5, § 54.2(c)(2); 12 MILGRIM,
supra note 1, § 2.09[7]. See notes 35-41 & accompanying text infra.
15. The California courts have held that, even when the identities of the customers are
not secret, if the customer list contains additional information regarding customers, such
additional information may constitute a trade secret. See, e.g., Scavengers Protective Ass'n
v. Serv-U-Garbage Co., 218 Cal. 568, 24 P.2d 489 (1933) (use of knowledge of "preferred
list" of customers, business from whom was particularly profitable, enjoinable); Dairy Dale
Co. v. Azevedo, 211 Cal. 344, 295 P. 10 (1931) (use of "friendly contact" with customers
enjoinable); Pasadena Ice Co. v. Reeder, 206 Cal. 697, 275 P. 944 (1929) (use of knowledge
of "peculiar likes and fancies" of customers enjoinable). See notes 25-34, 38-41 & accompa-
nying text infra.
16. For a discussion of non-list trade secrets and the liability standard applied in litiga-
tion involving such trade secrets see notes 95-115 & accompanying text infra.
17. 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952).
18. See text accompanying note 60 infra.
19. See notes 95-115 & accompanying text infra.
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This Note analyzes the Aetna decision and, based on a considera-
tion of case law leading up to Aetna, concludes that Aetna was not
intended to mandate proof of all five elements in list trade secrets cases,
but rather was intended to indicate five different types of unfair compe-
tition claims arising in customer list litigation. The Note rejects the
interpretation of Aetna found in list trade secrets cases that requires
proof of all five elements to support a list trade secrets claim, arguing
that such an interpretation may deprive employers of trade secret pro-
tection to which they should be entitled. The Note then considers stan-
dards set forth in non-list cases and suggests that the balancing
standard set forth in the California Court of Appeal case of Diodes, Inc.
v. Franzen,20 which permits courts to weigh expressly the competing
interests of former employers and employees, provides an appropriate
standard to be applied in both list and non-list trade secrets cases.
Thus, while a proper interpretation of Aetna would provide an ade-
quate standard in list trade secrets cases, the Note concludes that a bal-
ancing approach to trade secrets protection would be superior. An
additional advantage to the Diodes test is that the adoption of such a
standard would provide uniformity in the area of trade secrets and
would lend certainty to the employer-employee relationship by more
clearly delineating rights and duties with respect to trade secrets.
Customer List Trade Secrets
The type of trade secret most frequently the subject of litigation
between a former employer and employee in California is the customer
list. Such lists are disclosed to an employee primarily to assist in sales
or deliveries along specific routes serviced by the employer.21 Prior to
the decision in Aetna Building Maintenance Co. v. West,22 courts did not
focus on determining a standard to apply in list trade secrets cases; in
these cases the courts at least implicitly recognized that a former em-
ployer, to establish liability, need only prove an employer-employee
relationship, the existence and use of a trade secret disclosed to an em-
ployee, and resulting damage.2 3 Rather, the courts focused on the
problem of defining a trade secret.24 After Aetna, however, the courts
20. 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968).
21. Although customer list cases most frequently arise in connection with sales or deliv-
ery routes, they also may involve other types of customers with whom an employee deals, for
example, advertisers whom an employee calls upon to solicit business for an employer. See
Reid v. Mass Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 318 P.2d 54 (1957).
22. 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952).
23. See notes 40-41 & accompanying text infra.
24. A review of the California customer list cases up to and including Aetna may be
found in Hays, The California Law of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn-Against the Em-
ployer, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 38 (1953). See also Gregg, he Law of Trade Secrets in California,
24 CAL. ST. B.J. 15 (1949).
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lost sight of the need to define trade secrets and, by focusing on the
Aetna five elements, also lost sight of the previous standard. By apply-
ing all five elements to list trade secrets claims, the courts effectively
adopted a new standard which had no basis in prior trade secrets case
law. A review of the major list trade secrets cases up to Aetna illus-
trates this point.
The Development of List Trade Secrets Protection
The first case to deal with the typical list situation was Empire
Steam Laundry v. Lozier.25 In Empire, the California Supreme Court
enforced an express contract between a former employer and employee
not to solicit the plaintiff employer's customers, whose names were
found to be a trade secret. In dicta, the court noted that even absent the
contract an injunction would have issued, for "[e]quity always protects
against the unwarranted disclosure and unconscionable use of trade
secrets and confidential business communications. ' '2 6 Because the cus-
tomers' names were a trade secret, the court indicated that the defend-
ant's use of those names would have been sufficient in and of itself to
justify an injunction.
27
Over the next several years, the courts expanded the scope of list
matter considered to be a trade secret. In Pasadena Ice Co. v. Reeder,
2 8
for example, the supreme court affirmed an injunction against former
employees of plaintiff, prohibiting them from soliciting plaintiff's cus-
tomers-buyers whose names could be ascertained easily without resort
to plaintiff's list and therefore could not be a trade secret.29 The court
held, however, that knowledge of plaintiff's customers' "peculiar likes
and fancies and other characteristics,. . . which would greatly aid...
in securing and retaining the business of said former customers,
' 30
could constitute a trade secret; hence use of such knowledge could be
enjoined.31 Finding such knowledge of "peculiar likes and fancies,"
and finding use of that knowledge, the court affirmed the issuance of
the injunction.
Two years after Pasadena Ice, the supreme court, in Dairy Dale
Co. v. Azevedo, 32 again addressed the question of what constitutes a
trade secret. The defendant employee in Dairy Dale had received a
25. 165 Cal. 95, 130 P. 1180 (1913).
26. Id. at 99, 130 P. at 1182.
27. Id. at 99, 101-02, 130 P. at 1182, 1182-83. See also Cornish v. Dickey, 172 Cal. 120,
155 P. 629 (1916) (following Empire without elaboration).
28. 206 Cal. 697, 275 P. 944 (1929).
29. See, e.g., 2 CALLMANN, supra note 5, § 54.2(c)(2).
30. 206 Cal. at 704, 275 P. at 947.
31. Id. at 704-05, 275 P. at 947.
32. 211 Cal. 344, 295 P. 10 (1931) (per curiam).
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customer list from plaintiff showing names, addresses, and purchasing
requirements of customers and had solicited those customers for a rival
company. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's prohibition of
such solicitation. Although recognizing that plaintiff's customers were
generally known,33 the court nevertheless concluded a trade secret ex-
isted in the "friendly contact" established with those customers. 34 Be-
cause defendant had used this "friendly contact," the court found
liability.
Thus, the Empire, Pasadena Ice, and Dairy Dale cases were con-
cerned with defining a list trade secret. These cases combined show
that a list may represent any one of several trade secrets: the names of
customers; "peculiar likes and fancies" of those customers; or "friendly
contact" with those customers. A former employee's use of any one of
these trade secrets can be enjoined. As the appellate court decision in
Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse35 illustrates, however, a list does not always
embody a trade secret. In Avocado Sales the court refused to issue an
injunction against the former employee's solicitation of plaintiff's cus-
tomers because the customers were generally known and sales to them
did not depend on knowledge of "peculiar likes and fancies" or
"friendly contact."3 6 Avocado Sales exemplifies the treatment typically
given lists that embody only names of customers generally known.
37
The year after Avocado Sales, the supreme court, in Scavengers
Protective Association v. Serv-U-Garbage Co.,38 clarified somewhat
when a trade secret exists. The defendant former employee in Seaven-
gers argued that the names of plaintiff's customers were generally
known and that under an Avocado Sales rationale plaintiff's customer
list was not a trade secret. Although the court found that the names
were not well known and thus were a trade secret, it indicated that the
list would have been protectible anyway, because the defendant knew
which customers' business was particularly valuable.39 The court's de-
cision in Scavengers highlights the distinction between lists that em-
33. The "generally known" exception is frequently applied to wholesale customer lists.
See note 14 supra. Milgrim suggests that the true basis for denial of relief in such situations
is that the former employee prevented from selling to wholesalers effectively would be fore-
closed from competition. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 1, § 2.09[71[b].
34. 211 Cal. at 345, 295 P. at 10.
35. 122 Cal. App. 627, 10 P.2d 485 (1932).
36. Id. at 634, 10 P.2d at 488-89.
37. See, e.g., Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P.2d 9
(1944). In Continental Car-Na-Var the plaintiff manufacturer of cleaning compounds had
obtained an injunction against defendant former employee forbidding defendant's use of
trade secrets, including a customer list. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding
there was "no showing that in the normal course of events, plaintiff would have continued to
sell to any of its customers on the list." Id. at 109, 148 P.2d at 12.
38. 218 Cal. 568, 24 P.2d 489 (1933).
39. Id. at 572-73, 24 P.2d at 491-92.
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body trade secrets and those that do not. If the lists contain names of
customers not generally known, or contain valuable information per-
taining to the customers, they are a trade secret.
The distinction between the Empire, Pasadena Ice, and Dairy Dale
line of cases and the Avocado Sales line of cases thus was strictly fac-
tual. Both lines endorsed the basic proposition that equitable protec-
tion could be invoked to prevent a former employee from using trade
secrets of the former employer. In the former group of cases, the courts
found a trade secret; in the latter they did not. At this point, then, the
courts were not focusing on the elements of proof necessary to recover
against a former employee for use of a list trade secret. Rather, both
lines of cases recognized that the plaintiff must prove only: (1) an em-
ployer-employee relationship;40 (2) the existence of a trade secret;41 (3)
disclosure to the employee of that secret in confidence; (4) use of that
secret by the employee after leaving the employ of the employer; and
(5) resulting damage. In the typical route cases in which recovery was
allowed, as exemplified by Empire, Pasadena Ice, and Dairy Dale, the
plaintiff had established these elements. In the Avocado Sales type of
case the plaintiff had failed to establish the second element: the exist-
ence of secret information. Although Scavengers clarified somewhat
the distinctions between these two lines of cases, a case which set more
explicit guidelines for determining when a list or related information
fell within a particular line of cases was needed. Instead, the case of
California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham42 was decided.
In California Intelligence Bureau plaintiff compiled and distributed
informational brochures to subscribers. Defendant was employed to
solicit new subscribers and was furnished copies of the brochures and
lists of names of current and prospective subscribers. Upon his dis-
charge, defendant successfully solicited patronage from 80 of the 125
customers he had obtained for plaintiff.43 The trial court's injunction
prohibiting defendant's solicitation of customers and use of brochures
was affirmed in substance44 by the appellate court.
40. A trade secrets claim also may be asserted against those who, although not in the
employer-employee relationship, do stand in a confidential relationship with the trade secret
proprietor. See, e.g., George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 130 P.2d 399 (1942) (seller and
buyer of business), and cases cited note 99 infra.
41. Information that does not reach the status of a trade secret nonetheless may be
protectible. See note 4 supra. See Fidelity Appraisal Co. v. Federal Appraisal Co., 217 Cal.
307, 18 P.2d 950 (1933); Ernst & Ernst v. Carlson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 125, 55 Cal. Rptr. 626
(1966). An analysis of these situations is beyond the scope of this Note.
42. 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948).
43. Id. at 199-200, 188 P.2d at 304-05.
44. The court affirmed the injunction but limited its application to customers served by
plaintiff during defendant's employ. The court also struck down a further provision in the
injunction forbidding use of a questionnaire similar to plaintiffs. Id. at 204-05, 188 P.2d at
307-08.
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Although the court in California Intelligence Bureau easily could
have affirmed the injunction by relying on list trade secrets cases such
as Empire, Pasadena Ice, and Dairy Dale, the court appeared to deliver
a far more expansive opinion. This may have been in part an attempt
to answer the defendant's contention on appeal that there was "no evi-
dence to support a claim that he engaged in unfair trade practices or
competition. '45 As "unfair trade practices or competition" include
more than use of trade secrets and, for example, encompass such tor-
tious conduct as interference with business relations46 and fraud,47 per-
haps the court interpreted defendant's contention to require an analysis
of unfair competition claims in general, of which use of trade secrets
was one type.48 At any rate, the court reached beyond list trade secrets
in its discussion of liability and concluded that a "claim of unfair com-
petition" against the defendant could be upheld if the facts fell within
the "line of cases exemplified by" Empire.49 This "line of cases" cited
by the court was comprised of cases finding liability for unfair competi-
tion on several distinct theories. The line included the Empire and
Pasadena Ice cases, which based liability on use of list trade secrets.
However, it also included Gloria Ice Cream & Milk Co. v. Cowan,50 in
which plaintiffs customer list specifically was held not to be a trade
secret yet the defendant was enjoined from soliciting customers from
that list solely because he had done so with the intent to injure the
plaintiff. Also within this line were cases in which the claimed trade
secret was not a list.5
1
The court thus considered the Empire line as embodying cases
which, either on a trade secrets basis or on another basis, upheld an
45. Id. at 201, 188 P.2d at 305.
46. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
47. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 43 (1960).
48. The Restatement provides several examples of the various types of unfair competi-
tion claims. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757 (wrongful use of trade secrets); 759
(wrongful use of confidential information); 760 (misrepresentations as to competitor's
goods); 761 (false advertising); 766 (interference with contract or business relations) (1939).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958) (agent's duty not to use trade
secrets or confidential information after termination of agency).
49. 83 Cal. App. 2d at 201-02, 188 P.2d at 305-06. The court included within this line
of cases George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 130 P.2d 399 (1942); Gloria Ice Cream & Milk
Co. v. Cowan, 2 Cal. 2d 460, 41 P.2d 340 (1935); Scavengers Protective Ass'n v. Serv-U-
Garbage Co., 218 Cal. 568, 24 P.2d 489 (1933); Fidelity Appraisal Co. v. Federal Appraisal
Co., 217 Cal. 307, 18 P.2d 950 (1933); Pasadena Ice Co. v. Reeder, 206 Cal. 697, 275 P. 944
(1929); Wallich v. Koren, 80 Cal. App. 2d 223, 181 P.2d 682 (1947); and Riess v. Sanford, 47
Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941) (discussed at text accompanying notes 99-102 infra).
50. 2 CaL 2d 460, 41 P.2d 340 (1935).
51. See Riess v. Sanford, 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941) (claimed trade secret
was phonograph needle made from particular species of cactus; injunction granted).
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unfair competition claim involving retail sales or delivery routes. The
court characterized this line as imposing liability when:
(I) [T]he former employee is in possession of trade or business secrets
or confidential information, or the like, not readily accessible to
others; (2) the former employee solicits the customers of his former
employer in a competing business with intent to injure his former
employer's business; (3) the former employee solicits the customers
of his former employer, who comprise a list of preferred customers
whose trade is profitable to a supplier of a service, knowledge of
whom is a trade secret and confidential; (4) one concern is usually
patronized by a customer and the lists and names and addresses of
the customers are considered secret and have the character of prop-
erty; (5) there is an established business relationship between the cus-
tomer and the former employer which, unless interfered with,
normally continues.
52
As one commentator previously has pointed out,53 and as the foregoing
discussion indicates, the cases on which the appellate court relied to
reach its conclusions do not contain each and every one of the five enu-
merated elements. The court, however, failed to state clearly that this
characterization was a synthesis of the various independent situations
in which an unfair competition claim would stand and not a statement
of five factual circumstances all of which need be present to support a
trade secrets claim.
In affirming the issuance of the injunction the court distinguished
those cases not imposing liability, reasoning that the claim against the
defendant could not stand if the facts fit within the line of authority
represented by Avocado Sales.54 As cited by the court, this line of au-
thority consisted of cases denying relief in all types of unfair competi-
tion cases, not only in trade secrets cases.5 5 Thus, the distinction drawn
52. 83 Cal. App. 2d at 202, 188 P.2d at 306.
53. Hays, The California Law of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn-Against the Em-
ployer, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 38, 52 (1953).
54. 83 Cal. App. 2d at 202, 188 P.2d at 306. This line of cases included Continental
Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944); Cohn v. Clare, 6 Cal. App.
2d 504, 44 P.2d 634 (1935); and Theodore v. Williams, 44 Cal. App. 34, 185 P. 1014 (1919).
55. The court typified the second line of cases, which denied trade secret protection, as
requiring a showing that "(1) the customers solicited (a) do not constitute a trade secret, or
confidential information, or a confidential list in which a proprietary interest might be
claimed, or (b) are commonly known to the trade and are called upon by salesmen for
various companies, or are wholesale buyers whose names appear in directories and are so
few in number that anyone might readily discover them, and the list of them is not secret or
confidential; (2) the former employer is in open competition with others engaged in similar
business, selling in an open, competitive market; (3) the former employee was a salesman of
his former employer in a commercial field where there was no assurance of an order unless
he could satisfy his customer that his product was better, cheaper, or more salable than that
of his competitor, where the customer usually desired to examine, inspect and compare the
product and prices offered to him and each sale was a distinct transaction, not necessarily
implying that another will follow; (4) no secret or trust reposed in the former employee in
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by the court was not between lists amounting to trade secrets and those
not trade secrets, but between cases granting relief for unfair competi-
tion, of which use of list trade secrets was one type, and those denying
relief. The court, in discussing and citing to cases outside the list trade
secrets area, simply went beyond the needs of the case. Its characteri-
zation of the Empire line of cases accordingly should be considered
merely a listing of the types of situations in which an unfair competi-
tion claim may be viable.
The Aetna Decision
The Caifornia Intelligence Bureau decision was soon followed by
the California Supreme Court decision in Aetna Building Maintenance
Co. v. West.56 InAetna the court relied on the unfair competition anal-
ysis found in Caifornia Intelligence Bureau to enumerate five "princi-
ples governing the rights of the parties in connection with retail
delivery routes. ' ' 57 A careful reading of the Aetna decision shows that
the court, in adopting California Intelligence Bureau, understood Cali-
fornia Intelligence Bureau to be merely a generalized discussion of situ-
ations in which a potential unfair competition claim existed and not a
standard to be applied to list trade secrets claims only. Unfortunately,
because the court failed to acknowledge that proposition expressly,
Aetna has been and is now interpreted as requiring proof of all five
elements to establish the liability of a former employee for use of a list
trade secret.58
In Aetna the defendant, West, was a former salesman and supervi-
sor for plaintiff's janitorial service. When West began competing
against plaintiff, plaintiff sought an injunction, claiming its customer
lists, methods of estimating prices, and janitorial methods were trade
secrets which defendant could not use. The trial court granted an in-
junction prohibiting use of plaintiffs pricing and janitorial methods
and forbidding solicitation of plaintiff's customers.
The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision
and, relying on California Intelligence Bureau, set forth five principles
"governing the rights of the parties" 59 in retail route cases:
(1) The information was confidential and not readily accessible to
competitors; (2) The former employee solicited the customers of his
former employer with intent to injure him; (3) The former employee
the course of his employment is violated and no trade or business secret or confidential
information is used by the former employee." 83 Cal. App. 2d at 202-03, 188 P.2d at 306.
For commentary on this statement by the court, see Hays, The California Law of Unfair
Competition Takes a Turn-4gainst the Employer, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 38, 53 (1953).
56. 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952).
57. id. at 204-05, 246 P.2d at 15.
58. See note 73 & accompanying text infra.
59. 39 Cal. 2d at 204, 246 P.2d at 15.
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sought out certain preferred customers whose trade is particularly
profitable and whose identities are not generally known to the trade;
(4) The business is such that a customer will ordinarily patronize
only one concern; (5) The established business relationship between
the customer and the former employer would normally continue un-
less interfered with.
60
The court then proceeded to detail the factual inadequacies of the case
at hand, showing it did not fall within any of the five principles.
6'
What the court failed to state expressly was that had the case fallen
within any one enumerated area, the injunction would have been af-
firmed. For example, if the court had concluded that the list was a
trade secret, it could have relied on cases supporting its third element-
"[t]he former employee sought out certain preferred customers whose
trade is particularly profitable and whose identities are not generally
known to the trade" 62-to find liability. Similarly, if the court had con-
cluded that another type of unfair competition were present, for exam-
ple, interference with business relations,63 it could have relied on cases
supporting its fifth element--"[tlhe established business relationship
between the customer and the former employer would normally con-
tinue unless interfered with"64-to find liability. Unfortunately, the
court failed to provide such clarification. Nevertheless, the fact that the
court approved Caifornia Intelligence Bureau shows that its enumera-
tion of principles, like those in Calfornia Intelligence Bureau, should be
read as a generalized statement of types of unfair competition claims
which could arise in a route case, not as a standard to be applied in its
entirety in list trade secrets cases. This intention is further evidenced
by two statements made by the Aetna court.
The first such statement is found in the court's discussion of trade
secrets. The court remarked that "even in the absence of solicitation,
Aetna is entitled to protection against West's use, or disclosure in com-
petition with it, of trade secrets given to him only for the purpose of
carrying on his employer's business. '65 One of the court's five elements
requires solicitation with intent to injure.66 If this element were re-
quired to support a trade secrets claim, the court's statement that a
trade secret is protectible "even in the absence of solicitation" 67 would
be inconsistent. If the five elements are read only as examples of areas
in which unfair competition claims may arise, however, the court's re-
60. Id. at 204-05, 246 P.2d at 15.
61. Id. at 205, 246 P.2d at 15-16.
62. Id. at 204-05, 246 P.2d at 15.
63. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
64. 39 Cal. 2d at 205, 246 P.2d at 15.
65. Id.
66. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
67. 39 Cal. 2d at 204, 246 P.2d at 15.
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marks are entirely consistent. Such a reading is particularly appropri-
ate in light of the court's failure to apply the five elements as a whole to
the non-list trade secrets in the case (the pricing and janitorial meth-
ods).68
The second pertinent statement made by the court concerned un-
fair competition. The court noted that "equity will not enjoin a former
employee from soliciting business from his former employer's custom-
ers, provided his competition is fairly and legally conducted. ' 69 This
statement implies that an injunction may issue if the reverse is true, i.e.,
if an employee's solicitation of business from his or her former em-
ployer's customers is not "fairly or legally conducted." An ex-em-
ployee may use unfair or illegal tactics without using an employer's
trade secrets. The court itself details one such possible tactic: a "sug-
gestion to an Aetna customer that it cancel Aetna's contract and give
him [defendant] the business. '70 Presumably such an illegal tactic in
and of itself would be sufficient to find liability.71 The five elements, if
applied as a whole, would indicate otherwise. Yet if applied separately,
either the second element, solicitation of customers with intent to in-
jure, or the fifth element, "[t]he established business relationship be-
tween the customer and the former employer would normally continue
unless interfered with,"72 would be a sufficient basis of liability.
Thus, both in its discussion of trade secrets specifically and unfair
competition generally, the Aetna court indicated that the five enumer-
ated elements taken from California Intelligence Bureau were state-
ments of distinct situations in which potential unfair competition
claims would arise.
The Application of Aetna
Despite the apparent intent of the Aetna majority disclosed by a
careful reading of the decision, the majority of California appellate
courts have interpreted Aetna as requiring proof of all five elements to
establish an unfair competition claim based on use of list trade secrets;
however, most such decisions shed little light on the problems of proof
posed by such a requirement.73 Several appellate court decisions do
68. Id. at 206, 246 P.2d at 16.
69. Id. at 203, 246 P.2d at 14.
70. Id.
71. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939) (interference with business relations);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1977) (interference with another's performance
of contract).
72. 39 Cal. 2d at 205, 246 P.2d at 15.
73. Indeed, many of the decisions simply restate the five elements of Aetna and review
the facts showing all or none of the elements to be present. See, e.g., Nalley's Inc. v. Corona
Processed Foods, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 948, 50 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1966) (granting of preimi-
nary injunction not an abuse of discretion where evidence of all five Aetna elements pres-
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merit attention, however, as they illustrate creative judicial responses to
Aetna and to the harsh results that could flow from reading that case as
requiring proof of all of the enumerated elements.
The first customer list case after Aetna that did not involve an ex-
press contract 74 was Alex Foods, Inc. v. Mecalfe.75 In Alex Foods, the
plaintiff manufacturer and distributor of specialty food items obtained
ent); Peerless Oakland Laundry Co. v. Hickman, 205 Cal. App. 2d 556, 23 Cal. Rptr. 105
(1962) (judgmerit for plaintiff linen supply company enjoining solicitation of customers by
former route supervisor/sales manager affirmed; evidence sufficient to support finding of all
five Aetna requirements); Paraco, Inc. v. Owens, 166 Cal. App. 2d 777, 333 P.2d 360 (1959)
(judgment adverse to plaintiff affirmed where no evidence of any of Aetna's five elements);
Reid v. Mass Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 318 P.2d 54 (1957) (judgment for plaintiff enjoining
former sales manager from soliciting business from merchants affirmed; evidence of all five
Aetna elements present); Gordon v. Schwartz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 213, 305 P.2d 117 (1956)
(judgment for plaintiff sales company against former salesman affirmed; evidence of all five
Aetna elements present).
Several of the decisions cite Aetna or Caifornia Intelligence Bureau but do not explicitly
state their reliance on the five element test. See, e.g., King v. Pacific Vitamin Corp., 256 Cal.
App. 2d 841, 64 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1967) (judgment adverse to plaintiff affirmed); Mary Doe
Enterprises, Inc. v. Central Valley Professional Exch., Inc., 212 Cal. App. 2d 577, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (1963) (judgment adverse to plaintiff telephone service affirmed); American Loan
Corp. v. California Commercial Corp., 211 Cal. App. 2d 515, 27 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1963) (judg-
ment for plaintiff investment company affirmed); Western Electro-Plating Co. v. Henness,
180 Cal. App. 2d 442, 4 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1960) (judgment for plaintiff modified to allow
receiving unsolicited business from plaintiffs customers but otherwise affirmed); Lloyd Pest
Control Co. v. Lopez, 173 Cal. App. 2d 606, 343 P.2d 757 (1959) (judgment adverse to plain-
tiff affirmed).
74. It is interesting to note the increase in the number of cases involving customer list
trade secrets between an employer and employee that were litigated on the basis of an ex-
press contract in which the employee agreed not to utilize trade secrets, rather than on the
basis of the tort of breach of confidential relationship. The courts in contract cases do not
apply the Aetna requirements. Although nothing indicates the increase in contract cases was
due to the difficult Aetna proof requirements, the number of cases involving such express
contracts is significant in light of the fact that only one case prior to Aetna-Empire-was
litigated on the theory of express contract: Greenly v. Cooper, 77 Cal. App. 3d 382, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (1978) (court not required to consider validity of contract because evidence
showed all five Aetna elements satisfied); Golden State Linen Serv., Inc. v. Vidalin, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1977) (contract not to solicit customers not void under
§ 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code but no solicitation found); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App. 2d 418, 344 P.2d 821 (1959) (contract
not to use information disclosed by plaintiff insurance company to defendant agents up-
held); Fortna v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 323 P.2d 146 (1958) (contract not to solicit
customers held void under § 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code because
of lack of evidence that customer information was confidential); Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal.
2d 690, 321 P.2d 456 (1958) and Gordon v. Wasserman, 153 Cal. App. 2d 328, 314 P.2d 759
(1957) (contracts with plaintiff's employees not to solicit customers of plaintiff held valid);
Morris v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 476, 274 P.2d 22 (1954) (contract not to solicit or accept
business void under California Business and Professions Code § 16600). For a discussion of
employment contracts see Hays, Unfair Competition-Another Decade, 51 CALIF. L. REV.
51, 69-73, 77-78 (1963).
75. 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (1955).
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a preliminary injunction against its former employee who had left to
work for a competitor and had solicited business from plaintiff's cus-
tomers.76 Plaintiff's customers were food markets, restaurants, and caf-
eterias, and the majority of the customers solicited by the defendant did
not discontinue buying plaintiffs line of goods, but merely stocked de-
fendant's line in addition.
On appeal, the defendant in Alex Foods contended that the injunc-
tion was issued improperly because Aetna's five element test had not
been met.77 The appellate court was not convinced that proof of all five
elements was required,78 but in response to defendant's contention,
concluded:
As to [the fourth element of the Aetna test], it is clear that the re-
quirement that the business be such that a customer will ordinarily
patronize one concern is not established as to most of the customers
m dispute. In fact the evidence shows that a great portion of these
customers were food markets carrying competitive lines, and that
they do not ordinarily patronize only one concern. As to the fifth
element, although proof of a contrary finding might be supported, it
does appear that plaintiff's business with only a few of these custom-
ers would have necessarily continued unless interfered with.
79
Thus, only solicitation of a few customers potentially fell within the
five part test. Despite expressly noting this absence, as to some custom-
ers, of elements of the Aetna test,80 the court affirmed the injunction as
to those customers who "had been solicited by [defendant], and who
quit taking plaintiffs products because of such solicitation, and to
whom he was then selling his competitor's products."'' 8 The court in so
doing effectively rejected Aetna and formulated another test for deter-mining liability for use of a list trade secret:
Regardless of the classification into which the facts herein mentioned
bring this case, it is clear that if the continuance of an employer's
trade depends on keeping secret the names of customers or other val-
uable information known to such employer, his employee, having
gained knowledge of such secrets in the course of his employment,
cannot thereafter utilize such knowledge to the prejudice of his for-
mer employer.
8 2
This test, remarkably similar to the pre-Aetna standard found in cases
such as Empire, Pasadena Ice, and Dairy Dale, requires only that a
customer list contain secret information, that the list be disclosed to
76. The defendant had not copied or physically taken the list, but had remembered the
names of plaintiff's customers. The court held this to be sufficient. Id. at 425, 290 P.2d at
653.
77. Id. at 423, 290 P.2d at 652.
78. Id. at 426, 290 P.2d at 653.
79. Id. at 425, 290 P.2d at 653.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 427, 290 P.2d at 654.
82. Id. at 426-27, 290 P.2d at 654.
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and used by the former employee, and that the former employer be
prejudiced by such use. The court in effect isolated the only Aetna con-
sideration relevant in a list trade secrets case, that the employee sought
out customers "whose identities are not generally known."8 3 Quite
properly it did not consider other types of unfair competition claims.
In Southern Caifornia Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin,84 Aetna again
was not applied. In Lomkin, the defendant former salesman had been
given a route book listing plaintiff's customers. During his employ by
plaintiff, defendant simultaneously solicited these customers for a com-
petitor. Plaintiff obtained an injunction prohibiting such solicitation.
On appeal, defendant argued that the judgment should be reversed
because plaintiff had failed to establish all five elements in Aetna. The
court, although noting that all five elements potentially could be found,
concluded that such a finding was unnecessary because "[tihere is no
statement in the Aetna case to the effect that where fraud, deceit,
breach of contract and deception are present, as they are so present in
the case at hand, the business of plaintiff is open to invasion on the part
of a former employee and a scheming entrepreneur. ' 85 The court's
statement that there was much more in Lomkin than in Aetna empha-
sizes that an unfair competition claim against a former employee does
not necessarily have to have its basis in trade secrets law, even if based
on unlawful use of customer lists. The court recognized that when a
former employee is guilty of "fraud, deceit, breach of contract and de-
ception," an employer may have a cause of action for unfair competi-
tion, even absent a protectible trade secret. Thus, although in Lomkin
plaintiff's customer list was found to be a trade secret, the court did not
find it necessary to rely on that theory of liability to protect plaintiff.
Had the court adopted the usual interpretation of the Aetna test, how-
ever, the plaintiff might not have recovered, since not all five elements
were established. In consequence, serious anticompetitive conduct
would have continued.
In Whitted v. Williams,86 the court of appeal did rely on a trade
secrets theory to protect the plaintiff, but it too refused to require all
five Aetna elements. In Whitted, the defendant former employee deliv-
ered ice along a specified route. Upon defendant's employment by a
competitor, plaintiff obtained an injunction against his solicitation of
business from plaintiff's customers. 87 The appellate court, in affirming
83. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
84. 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960).
85. Id. at 447, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
86. 226 Cal. App. 2d 52, 37 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1964).
87. The trial court's injunction also prohibited defendant from soliciting business from
customers who made purchases at plaintiffs public dock. The court of appeal reversed this
portion of the injuction, finding the identities of such customers not secret or confidential.
d. at 58, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
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this portion of the judgment, reviewed customer list cases up to and
including Aetna. The court viewed Aetna as a "summarization of fac-
tors"8 8 to be used as "'a guide in the determination of what constitutes
unfair competition by a former employee.' "89 The Wfhitted court relied
on trade secrets cases only, which it concluded "supported in full meas-
ure" 90 its judgment, to affirm the injunction. Again, had Aetna been
applied and the five elements required, the plaintiff might have been
denied recovery, with disastrous consequences to his business.
The Alex Foods, Lomkin, and Whitted cases unfortunately are
atypical of the treatment of customer list problems since Aetna. By far
the majority of decisions at least implicitly have required all five Aetna
elements in a list trade secrets case.91 For example, as recently as 1978,
in Greenly v. Cooper,92 the court restrained former employees from
soliciting customers of a mortgage loan brokerage business only after
finding all five Aetna elements present. 93 Such a misapplication of
Aetna could work substantial harm on a business. If Aetna were inter-
preted correctly, the potential for harm would be reduced somewhat.
By adopting in trade secrets cases the balancing test advocated below,
however, there would be even less potential for such harsh results.
Aetna would then be, as originally intended, a "'guide in the determi-
nation of what constitutes unfair competition by a former em-
ployee.' -94
Non-List Trade Secrets
In contrast to the extensive case law regarding the rights of former
employers and employees in customer list trade secrets disputes, there
is little authority in California involving trade secrets which are not
customer lists. Because this area of trade secrets law can embrace de-
signs, methods, processes, and a variety of other information or de-
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Reid v. Mass Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 301, 318 P.2d 54, 60 (1957))
(emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. See note 73 supra. For an application of Aetna that barred a complaint at the
pleading stage see American Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 149 Cal. App. 2d 215, 308 P.2d 494
(1957). See also Mathews Paint Co. v. Seaside Paint Co., 148 Cal. App. 2d 168, 306 P.2d 113
(1957). Autsee Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 458, 151 Cal. Rptr.
118 (1978) (refusing to apply the five Aetna elements "supposedly necessary" to a finding of
liability).
92. 77 Cal. App. 3d 382, 143 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1978).
93. Id. at 392-93, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
94. Whitted v. Williams, 226 Cal. App. 2d 52, 58, 37 Cal. Rptr. 692, 696-97 (quoting
Reid v. Mass Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 301, 318 P.2d 54, 60 (1957)).
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vices, 95 for convenience this Note terms such trade secrets "non-list"
trade secrets.
Prior to the 1952 Aetna decision only one California case had ad-
dressed the issue of the protectibility of non-list trade secrets,96 and it
applied the same proof requirements as did the list cases.97 The non-
list cases after Aetna continued to apply this same standard.98 Accord-
ingly, there has been no revolution in the elements of proof for non-list
cases corresponding to that worked by the Aetna decision on list trade
secrets cases. Those changes that have occurred reflect an effort to ac-
commodate to a greater degree the equitable nature of a trade secret
claim by expressly considering the competing interests of the former
employer and employee and do not represent a radical departure from
earlier decisions.
The General Approach to Non-List Trade Secrets
The first non-list trade secrets case between a former employer and
employee to hold that such a trade secret was protectible was Riess v.
Sanford.9 9 In Riess the plaintiff manufactured phonograph needles
95. For a discussion of the definition of a trade secret see notes 1-6 & accompanying
text supra.
96. The California Supreme Court, for example, has never addressed this issue directly.
The closest it has come to such a discussion is in Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d
327, 411 P.2d 921, 49 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966) (fiduciary liable for wrongful use of confidential
information).
97. See Riess v. Sanford, 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941).
98. See notes 103-06 & accompanying text infra.
99. 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 117 P.2d 694 (1941). Eleven years earlier, in Germo Mfg. Co.
v. McClellan, 107 Cal. App. 532, 290 P. 534 (1930), the court of appeal in dicta indicated
that an employer could obtain relief against a former employee utilizing non-list trade
secrets of the employer. In Germo, the plaintiff had sued a former employee to enjoin use of
secret antiseptic compound formulas, receipts, labels, and other information. The appellate
court, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint on procedural grounds, stated
in dicta: "If the allegations of appellant's complaint are true, there can be no doubt about
the action being a proper one for equitable relief. Injunction is a proper remedy to enjoin
those who, having as former trusted employees gained confidential information from the
employer, seek to use such information for their own private gain in competing with the
employer's business, or in behalf of a rival concern." Id. at 541, 290 P. at 538 (citations
omitted). The California Supreme Court also had addressed the issue of the protectibility of
non-list trade secrets in Hollywood Motion Picture Equip. Co. v. Furer, 16 Cal. 2d 184, 105
P.2d 299 (1940), a case which did not involve an employer-employee relationship. In
Hollywood Motion Picture, plaintiff had developed a microphone and other sound devices
and had contracted with defendant for the manufacture of such devices. Upon the defend-
ant's appropriation of the devices, plaintiff sued, and the California Supreme Court, revers-
ing the lower court's decision, held such use enjoinable, not because the information
constituted a trade secret but because the defendant stood in a contractually imposed confi-
dential relationship. Id. at 188-89, 105 P.2d at 301. For examples of trade secrets in confi-
dential relationships other than that of employer-employee, see Show Mgmt. v. Hearst
Publishing Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d 606, 16 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1961) (advertiser-newspaper; relief
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from cactus spines, the species of which was known only to plaintiff.
Defendant entered plaintiffs employ "with the secret intention of gath-
ering such information for the purpose of using it in future competition
with plaintiff."' 00 The court of appeal, in affirming the lower court's
award of damages and issuance of an injunction, found the controlling
law to be
that no agent or employee having been intrusted in the course of his
employment with secret and valuable information known only to his
employer may thereafter utilize this secret knowledge against the in-
terests or to the prejudice of his employer .... This principle ... is
carried into the State Labor Code, section 2860 reading: "Everything
which an employee acquires by virtue of his employment, except the
compensation which is due to him from his employer, belongs to the
employer, whether acquired lawfully or unlawfully, or during or af-
ter the expiration of the term of his employment."' 0'1
This statement by the court indirectly sets forth the proof requirements
in non-list trade secrets cases: a former employer-employee relation-
ship; the existence of secret and valuable information "intrusted" to the
employee "in the course of his employment"; and use of such informa-
tion "against the interests or to the prejudice of his employer." In es-
sence, the court required proof of the confidential relationship,
existence and use of a trade secret, and resulting damage. Significantly,
Riess drew support for its standard from previously-decided customer
list cases, citing the Empire line of cases.' 0 2 Thus, Riess suggests that,
at least at that time, the courts agreed on the standard of liability in
trade secrets cases and agreed that such a standard was applicable to
list and non-list trade secrets alike. Only after Aetna did the proof ele-
ments for list and non-list cases begin to diverge.
Seventeen years elapsed after the Riess decision before a non-list
case between a former employer and employee again reached the ap-
denied); Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1960) (inventor-manufac-
turer; relief granted); King v. Gerold, 109 Cal. App. 2d 316, 240 P.2d 710 (1952) (inventor-
licensee; relief granted); Gate-Way, Inc. v. Wilson, 94 Cal. App. 2d 706, 211 P.2d 311 (1949)
(manufacturer-consulting engineer;, relief denied).
100. 47 Cal. App. 2d at 245, 117 P.2d at 695.
101. Id. at 246-47, 117 P.2d at 695 (citations omitted). California Labor Code § 2860,
cited by the court, is still in force. However, it has not been relied upon as the basis of
liability in an employer-employee trade secrets case. Similarly, although the courts have
cited to § 396 of the second Restatement of Agency, they have never expressly relied on it.
That section provides in part: "Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency,
the agent... has a duty to the principal not to use or to disclose to third persons, on his
own account or on account of others, in competition with the principal or to his injury, trade
secrets, written lists of names, or other similar confidential matters given to him only for the
principals use or acquired by the agent in violation of duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 396 (1958).
102. See notes 25-41 & accompanying text supra.
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pellate court level.' 0 3 The decision in By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane
Tape Co.' °4 exemplifies the standard now generally applied in non-list
trade secrets cases. In By-Buk plaintiff had obtained an injunction
against several co-partners and a former employee prohibiting defend-
ants' assembly and use of machinery which plaintiff claimed as a trade
secret. In affirming that portion of the injunction against the former
employee, the court of appeal concluded that trade secrets disclosed to
an employee are "property of the employer and the employee holds
that property in trust for the employer and cannot use it in violation of
his trust."' 1 5 The court's authority in support of this proposition in-
cluded two California cases: Empire, the first list case and Riess, the
first non-list case. Aetna was not mentioned.
The Diodes Approach to Non-List Trade Secrets
As By-Buk illustrates, in cases involving non-list trade secrets liti-
gation between former employers and employees 0 6 the courts gener-
ally have required proof of a previous employer-employee relationship,
the existence and use of a trade secret disclosed pursuant to that rela-
tionship, and resulting damage. The conflicting equitable demands of
the parties10 7 have been noticed by the courts, 0 8 but the decisions have
not focused on an approach that expressly weighs these competing in-
terests. In Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen,10 9 however, the court of appeal ex-
plicitly recognized the various equitable concerns of the parties and
adopted a balancing approach to trade secrets protection.
In Diodes, the plaintiff corporation brought an action against for-
mer directors, officers, and employees of plaintiff. Plaintiff apparently
contended that defendants had misappropriated a secret process for
manufacturing a type of semi-conductor. The trial court's dismissal of
plaintiffs third amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action
was affirmed by the court of appeal, with the court noting plaintiff had
failed to plead facts sufficient to show the existence of a trade secret. I0
103. Several cases on non-list secrets in actions involving a confidential relationship
other than that of employer-employee were decided in the interim, however. See note 99
supra.
104. 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329 P.2d 147 (1958).
105. Id. at 164, 329 P.2d at 151.
106. See, e.g., Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198
(1962); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 398, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268
(1961), overruled in part on other grounds in Nicholas v. Hast, 62 Cal. 2d 598, 601, 400 P.2d
763, 765, 43 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1965).
107. See notes 7-11 & accompanying text supra.
108. See, e.g., Plant Indus., Inc. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636, 640 (C.D. Cal. 1968);
Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 286, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 209 (1962)
(quoting Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960)).
109. 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968).
110. Id. at 251, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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The court set forth in its opinion the elements to be pleaded and proved
in a trade secrets case between a former employer and employee:
(1)[T]he existence of subject matter which is capable of protection as
a trade secret; (2) the secret was disclosed to the defendant, or to a
person for whose conduct a defendant is liable, under circumstances
giving rise to a contractual or other legally imposed obligation on the
part of the disclosee not to use or disclose the secret to the detriment
of the discloser; and (3) if the defendant is an employee or former
employee of the plaintiff or if the defendant is charged with having
received the secret from an employee or former employee, the facts
alleged must also show that the public policy in favor of the protec-
tion of the complainant's interest in maintaining the secret outweighs
the interest of the employee in using his knowledge to support him-
self in other employment. I
The court noted that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently set forth the confi-
dential relationship between plaintiff and defendants, but went on to
conclude that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficiently the trade secret
status of its process. Thus, although plaintiff had adequately pleaded
disclosure of information to the defendants in confidence, the second
element of the court's test, it had not shown the information to be a
trade secret, the first element. As a result, the court unfortunately did
not reach a detailed discussion of its balancing test.
Although the defendants in Diodes were directors and officers as
well as employees of the plaintiff corporation, the court in Diodes did
not specifically restrict its decision to cases involving a fiduciary rela-
tionship rather than an employer-employee relationship. While such a
restriction theoretically could be asserted, Cal Francisco Investment
Corp. v. rionis"12 makes the distinction, at least in a non-list trade
secrets case, unimportant in practice. In Cal Francisco the plaintiff
sought an injunction against a former employee with whom it did not
stand in a fiduciary relationship. Plaintiff's four-count complaint in-
cluded allegations of use of plaintiff's trade secrets by defendant, a for-
mer salesman for plaintiff. The lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs
complaint was affirmed by the appellate court, which concluded that
plaintiff did not possess any trade secrets. Importantly, the court cited
the Diodes test as controlling."13
The balancing approach to trade secrets litigation between a for-
mer employer and employee adopted by the court of appeal in Diodes,
and extended in Cal Francisco, was an important refinement of the
proof requirements in non-list cases. The test explicitly incorporates as
an element of proof the competing equitable interests of a former em-
ployer and employee, interests which were recognized in previous trade
I 11. Id. at 250, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
112. 14 Cal. App. 3d 318, 92 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1971).
113. Id. at 321-22, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
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secrets cases. 114 Diodes additionally is important because the decision
is not restricted to non-list trade secrets, but ostensibly applies to any
"subject matter which is capable of protection as a trade secret."'" 5
Comparison of the Aetna and Diodes Tests
The elements found in Aetna and Diodes are strikingly different;
their distinctions are even more pointed when it is remembered that the
courts are addressing in essence the same problem: the protectibility of
an employer's trade secrets from use by a former employee. Indeed,
the separate treatment of list trade secrets required by courts interpret-
ing Aetna has no basis in precedent." 6 The Aetna test as interpreted
enlarges the proof requirements and can operate to deprive a former
employer of a significant business asset. Further, a court conceivably
could confuse the standards in list and non-list cases and apply Aetna
to a non-list trade secret. Because an employer could meet the Aetna
requirements only rarely in such a situation, this too would deprive an
employer of a valuable asset. Even were Aetna to be interpreted cor-
rectly, however, its test would not be applicable to non-list cases. Thus,
if a uniform standard is to be adopted, the Diodes test is more appro-
priate. A comparison of three differences between Aetna as currently
interpreted and Diodes exemplifies both the inadequacies of the Aetna
test and the superiority of the Diodes test in trade secrets litigation.
The first difference is the requirement of "intent to injure" found
in the Aetna test, which mandates a showing that "[t]he former em-
ployee solicited the customers of his former employer with intent to
injure him."' 7 In contrast, Diodes does not predicate relief upon a
finding of a specific intent. Logically, the intent requirement found in
Aetna has no place in a trade secrets case. If a former employee enters
into competition with intent to injure a former employer, that employee
should be liable for unfair competition even absent a trade secret."
8
Generally, the basis of a trade secrets claim against a former employee
is breach of a confidential relationship, i e., an abuse of trust by a for-
mer employee by the use of secrets disclosed to him or her by the em-
ployer. To require specific intent before establishing liability is
114. See note 108 & accompanying text supra.
115. 260 Cal. App. 2d at 250, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
116. See notes 25-41 & accompanying text supra.
117. 39 Cal. 2d at 204, 246 P.2d at 15.
118. See Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr.
43 (1960). The distinction between the two bases of liability is set forth in Annot., 28
A.L.R.3d 7 (1969), which states that unfair competition claims fall into two broad categories,
"those relating objectively to the nature and characteristics of the information sought to be
protected [e.g., trade secrets or confidential information], and those relating to the knowl-
edge, motives, intentions, and conduct of the parties [e.g., intent to injure]." Id. at 19.
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comparable to requiring specific intent in a case involving breach of
contract.1 19 In a trade secrets case, the breach is use of the secret, not
its use with specific intent. The damage sustained by a former em-
ployer as a result of the breach is as great in the one instance as it is in
the other. The Diodes test quite properly omits such a requirement.
A second difference between the Aetna and Diodes tests is that the
former requires proof of solicitation of customers, 20 while the latter
requires proof of "use" of trade secrets.' 2' While solicitation of cus-
tomers is an appropriate limitation on liability in list cases' 22-solicita-
tion essentially being the means of gauging use-it is completely
inapplicable in non-list cases. Thus Aetna, even if properly interpreted,
would not be an appropriate uniform standard to apply in all trade
secrets cases. The use requirement in Diodes, on the other hand, is
readily adaptable to list cases.
A final difference between the Aetna and Diodes tests is that the
latter takes a balancing approach to trade secrets problems. Such an
approach acknowledges the policy considerations behind trade secrets
protection by explicitly recognizing as a specific element of proof the
competing interests of former employers and employees which earlier
cases recognized only implicitly.123 Under a standard that does not al-
low for explicit consideration of such interests, the courts are forced to
devise legal reasons for decisions which in essence are founded upon
equitable principles.
A more rational approach would be to establish guidelines for de-
termining when subject matter is or is not a trade secret, as Scavengers
in part attempted to do years ago.' 24 If a court found a trade secret
existed, but determined the interests of the former employer in the
trade secret to be less than the interests of the employee in employment,
the court could deny protection despite the trade secret.' 25 The court,
in making such a determination, could consider such factors as the ex-
tent to which the defendant employee was foreclosed from competition,
the monetary value of the claimed trade secret, and the extent to which
119. The aptness of this analogy is highlighted by the fact that liability may be based on
breach of an implied contract of employment. See note 13 supra.
120. 39 Cal. 2d at 204, 246 P.2d at 15.
121. 260 Cal. App. 2d at 250, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
122. See, e.g., New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 161 P. 990 (1916)
(prohibiting solicitation of customers but not the receiving of unsolicited business from those
customers).
123. See note 108 & accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 38-39 & accompanying text supra.
125. Such an approach is entirely supported by the fact that possession of a trade secret
does not confer an absolute property right, but only a proprietary right enforceable to pre-
vent improper discovery or use. See, e.g., Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App.
2d 279, 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 207 (1962).
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continuation of the former employer's business depended upon the se-
crecy of the information. Thus, if the employee would be absolutely
foreclosed from competition while the employer losing the trade secret
would be minimally damaged, the court could deny trade secret protec-
tion. Conversely, if loss of the trade secret would mean financial ruin
to a former employer's business, while the employee had other avenues
of entry into competition, trade secret protection could be granted.
Without a balancing approach, the court in these situations might have
to manipulate the definition of trade secrets to achieve the same result.
A resort to such fictitious distinctions is unnecessary when an explicit
recognition of the equitable considerations involved would provide a
fair means of achieving the desired end. The Diodes test, with its ex-
press recognition of the policy basis of trade secrets decisions, is a far
more sensible approach to trade secrets problems and the equitable
considerations they necessarily entail.
By adopting the Diodes test as the uniform standard to be applied
in all trade secrets litigation between a former employer and employee,
the courts could eliminate Aetna as currently interpreted, thus remov-
ing proof requirements which may unfairly deny the owners of trade
secrets protection to which they should be entitled. This also would
merge the list and non-list areas of trade secrets law, eliminating the
potential for confusion of the two standards in trade secrets cases. And,
by choosing Diodes over a corrected Aetna, the courts could look to the
Diodes balance to deal honestly with the equitable problems in trade
secrets cases.
Conclusion
A trade secret is potentially one of the most valuable assets of a
business. A California employer whose business depends on the con-
tinued secrecy of that asset and who has expended substantial time,
effort, and money in developing it, understandably will seek to prevent
its use by an employee to whom the trade secret has been disclosed,
should that employee enter into competition with his or her former em-
ployer. So long as the employee's employment mobility and usable
knowledge are not limited unfairly, the courts should protect the trade
secret.
The California courts have recognized the necessity of protecting
information, processes, or the like when their claimed trade secret sta-
tus is justified. However, by interpreting Aetna as requiring proof of
five separate elements before liability is established in a list trade
secrets case, and by failing to formulate a standard of proof applicable
to all types of trade secrets litigation between former employers and
employees, the courts have lent unnecessary uncertainty to California
trade secrets law and, at a more basic level, to the employer-employee
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relationship. By adopting the elements of proof set forth in Diodes, Inc.
v. Franzen126 as a uniform standard, much of this uncertainty could be
alleviated. Under such a formula, application of incorrect proof re-
quirements would be less likely, perhaps allaying the fears of litigating
employers. Further, under the balancing approach in Diodes, employ-
ees to whom trade secrets are disclosed should not need to fear that
they will not be allowed to find employment in their field of expertise
after leaving their former employers' business. Aetna, even if correctly
applied, cannot boast such an express equitable approach. The adop-
tion of the Diodes balancing test in all employer-employee trade secrets
cases thus is vitally important.
126. 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968).
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